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DTSTART:20251026T030000
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UID:calendar.138606.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260615T041446Z
CREATED:20251112T171001Z
DESCRIPTION:Jana Gieselmann (University of Edinburgh)\, “(Mis-)Matchmaker”\
 , Economics of Platforms Seminar\, December 4\, 2025\, 14:00–15:00\, room 
 Zoom.\n\nAs platforms collect more user data\, they can tailor algorithms 
 to better match users. At the same time\, on matching platforms\, users pa
 y to be matched by the platform\, while the platform makes money as long a
 s it does not match them. This paper analyzes the matching rule of a profi
 t-maximizing monopoly platform when the incentives between users and the p
 latform are misaligned. I demonstrate that frequently studied matching rul
 es\, such as random matching and PAM\, can be suboptimal for the platform.
  Contrary to the intuition that more data about users might improve matchi
 ng efficiency and speed\, I show that more data allows the platform to des
 ign a matching rule that strategically lowers match quality to increase se
 arch time and thus profits\, leading to unnecessary delays and potentially
  inefficient matches. Finally\, I provide explanations for why platforms i
 nduces search for users: complexity-constraint pricing\, targeted advertis
 ing or the presence of\noverconfident users.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20251204T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20251204T150000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:December 4\, 2025\, 14:00–15:00\, room Zoom
SUMMARY:Economics of Platforms Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2025-mis-matchmaker
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