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DTSTART:20251026T030000
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UID:calendar.137664.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260609T085147Z
CREATED:20250709T081001Z
DESCRIPTION:David Levine (University of London)\, “Theory and Long Term Pla
 y in Experimental Economics”\, Economic Theory Seminar\, Toulouse: TSE\, N
 ovember 18\, 2025\, 11:00–12:15\, room Auditorium 3.\n\nI examine three si
 mple parsimonious theories of long-term play in experimental economics\, r
 efined perfection\, Fehr-Schmidt\, and behavioral mechanism design. Refine
 d perfection has known flaws\, and Fehr-Schmidt shares some of these flaws
 . By some measures it does better for games in which incentives matter\, o
 n others worse. By contrast\, behavioral mechanism design does better on a
 ll counts\, and does a better job than existing theories of learning in pr
 edicting when players will successfully coordinate. This strongly suggests
  that players do not come to the laboratory with fixed preconceived notion
 s\, but rather adapt their behavior to try to achieve socially desirable o
 utcomes.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20251118T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20251118T121500
LAST-MODIFIED:20251118T011001Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, November 18\, 2025\, 11:00–12:15\, room Auditorium
  3
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2025-theory-and-long-term-play-
 experimental-economics
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