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UID:calendar.137653.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260414T192301Z
CREATED:20250708T141001Z
DESCRIPTION:Tan Gan (London School of Economics)\, “Robust Delegation”\, Ec
 onomic Theory Seminar\, Toulouse: TSE\, September 9\, 2025\, 10:15–11:30\,
  room Auditorium 6.\n\nWe argue that simple delegation rules are optimal i
 n the presence of uncertainty in\nhow agents manipulate delegation rules f
 or their own private interest by considering\na max-min delegation design 
 problem\, in which the principal has limited information\nabout the agent’
 s preferences. In particular\, the principal only has limited information
 \non the agent’s preferred actions in each state but does not know how the
  agent trades off\namong suboptimal options once constrained. The principa
 l has a prior over state and\nevaluates a delegation set by its worst expe
 cted payoff among all possible preferences\nof the agent. We show that the
  optimal delegation set is always convex\, which implies\nthat interval de
 legation is always optimal when the action space is in one dimension.\nIn 
 high dimension\, the uncertainty of manipulation can be so large that the 
 principal\nmay delegate actions that are never optimal in any state or eve
 n delegate the entire\naction sets. Joint with Ricardo Alonso and Ju Hu
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250909T111500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250909T123000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, September 9\, 2025\, 10:15–11:30\, room Auditorium
  6
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2025-robust-delegation
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