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DTSTART:20251026T030000
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UID:calendar.137364.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260811T051448Z
CREATED:20250519T071001Z
DESCRIPTION:Michael Sullivan\, “Fee Optimality in a Multi-Sided Market”\, E
 conomics of Platforms Seminar\, June 3\, 2025\, 14:00–15:00\, Zoom Meeting
 .\n\nThis article studies the efficiency and distributional properties of 
 platform fees in\nthe US food delivery sector. Using a structural model es
 timated on data covering all\nmajor delivery platforms\, I quantify distor
 tions arising from platform market power\,\ncross-side externalities\, and
  features commonly excluded from canonical models of\nplatform pricing: in
 tra-platform competition\, substitution to offline ordering (cannibalizati
 on)\,\nand platform competition. I find that profit-maximizing platforms s
 et\nconsumer fees that are only slightly excessive\, as the cannibalizatio
 n distortion partially\noffsets the upward pressure from market power. In 
 contrast\, restaurant commissions\nare nearly twice as high as their welfa
 re-optimal levels. Commission caps\nimprove welfare when set at moderate l
 evels (20–30%) but reduce it at lower levels\n(e.g.\, 15%) by raising cons
 umer fees and shrinking the user base that benefits from\nexpanded restaur
 ant variety. Cannibalization explains much of the cross-market\nvariation 
 in the gap between profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing commission\nra
 tes. Simulations further show that platform competition tends to reduce co
 nsumer\nfees but raise seller fees\, implying that competition does not co
 rrect the bias\nof platform fee structures against merchants.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250603T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250603T160000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:June 3\, 2025\, 14:00–15:00\, Zoom Meeting
SUMMARY:Economics of Platforms Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2025-fee-optimality-multi-sided
 -market
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