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UID:calendar.136819.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260606T081427Z
CREATED:20250205T181001Z
DESCRIPTION:Leon Musolff (Wharton Pennsylvania University)\, “Sources of Ma
 rket Power in Web Search: Evidence from a Field Experiment”\, Industrial O
 rganization seminar\, TSE\, April 28\, 2025\, 14:15–15:30\, room Auditoriu
 m 4.\n\nWe evaluate the economic forces that contribute to Google’s large 
 market share in web search. We develop a model of search engine demand in 
 which consumer choices are influenced by switching costs\, quality beliefs
 \, and inattention\, and estimate it using a field experiment with US desk
 top internet users. We find that (i) requiring Google users to make an act
 ive choice among search engines increases Bing’s market share by only 1.1 
 percentage points\, implying that switching costs play a limited role\; (i
 i) Google users who accept our payment to try Bing for two weeks update po
 sitively about its relative quality\, with 33 percent preferring to contin
 ue using it\; and (iii) after changing the default from Google to Bing\, m
 any users do not switch back\, consistent with persistent inattention. In 
 our model\, correcting beliefs and removing choice frictions would increas
 e Bing’s market share by 15 percentage points and increase consumer surplu
 s by $6 per consumer-year. Policies that expose users to alternative searc
 h engines lower Google’s market share more than those requiring active cho
 ice. We then use Microsoft search logs to assess the impact of additional 
 data on search result relevance. The results suggest that sharing Google’s
  click-and-query data with Microsoft may have a limited effect on market s
 hares.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250428T151500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250428T163000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:TSE\, April 28\, 2025\, 14:15–15:30\, room Auditorium 4
SUMMARY:Industrial Organization seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2025-sources-market-power-web-s
 earch-evidence-field-experiment
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