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DTSTART:20241027T030000
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UID:calendar.135535.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260312T172753Z
CREATED:20240906T121001Z
DESCRIPTION:Aaron Barkley (University of Melbourne)\, “Haggle or Hammer? Du
 al-Mechanism Housing Search”\, Econometrics and Empirical Economics Semina
 r\, TSE\, September 10\, 2024\, 15:30–16:50\, room Auditorium 4.\n\nThis p
 aper concerns how trade mechanism choice affects how decentralized markets
  respond\nto shocks and policy choices. We consider this issue in the cont
 ext of housing market\nsearch. We pose a dynamic search model in which age
 nts can trade by auction or negotiation\,\nboth featuring two-sided incomp
 lete information. We apply the model to housing data\,\nestimating buyer a
 nd seller value distributions using a structural auction model\, primitive
 s\nthat are used in solving for the search model equilibrium. Adding aucti
 ons as a second\nmechanism dampens the shock response of prices and values
  as agents optimally switch\nbetween mechanisms. We also find that policie
 s that increase seller information disclosure\nat one mechanism can noneth
 eless benefit sellers and harm buyers\, at odds with their\nintended purpo
 se. Our estimates also highlight how mechanism efficiency assumptions infl
 uence\nsearch cost inference\, with estimated seller negotiation search co
 sts significantly\nlower under Nash bargaining than incomplete information
 .\n(With David Genesoveb and James Hansena)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20240910T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20240910T175000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:TSE\, September 10\, 2024\, 15:30–16:50\, room Auditorium 4
SUMMARY:Econometrics and Empirical Economics Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2024-haggle-or-hammer-dual-mech
 anism-housing-search
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