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UID:calendar.135330.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260610T211132Z
CREATED:20240711T071001Z
DESCRIPTION:Anton Kolotilin (University of New South Wales Australian Schoo
 l of Business)\, “The economics of partisan gerrymandering”\, Economic The
 ory Seminar\, Toulouse: TSE\, October 15\, 2024\, 11:00–12:30\, room Audit
 orium 3.\n\nWe study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns v
 oters to equipopulous districts so as to maximize his party’s expected sea
 t share. The designer faces both aggregate\, district-level uncertainty (h
 ow many votes his party will receive) and idiosyncratic\, voter-level unce
 rtainty (which voters will vote for his party). We argue that pack-and-pai
 r districting\, where weaker districts are “packed” with a single type of 
 voter\, while stronger districts contain two voter types\, is typically op
 timal for the gerrymanderer. The optimal form of pack-and-pair districting
  depends on the relative amounts of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertaint
 y. When idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates\, it is optimal to pack opposi
 ng voters and pair more favorable voters\; this plan resembles traditional
  “packing-and-cracking.” When aggregate uncertainty dominates\, it is opti
 mal to pack moderate voters and pair extreme voters\; this “matching slice
 s” plan has received some attention in the literature. Estimating the mode
 l using precinct-level returns from recent US House elections indicates th
 at\, in practice\, idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates and packing opponen
 ts is optimal\; moreover\, traditional pack-and-crack districting is appro
 ximately optimal. We discuss implications for redistricting reform and pol
 itical polarization. Methodologically\, we exploit a formal connection bet
 ween gerrymandering—partitioning voters into districts—and information des
 ign—partitioning states of the world into signals.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20241015T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20241015T133000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, October 15\, 2024\, 11:00–12:30\, room Auditorium 
 3
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2024-economics-partisan-gerryma
 ndering
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