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UID:calendar.135297.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260809T101230Z
CREATED:20240710T141001Z
DESCRIPTION:Modibo Camara (Stanford Graduate School of Business)\, “Doubly 
 Robust Monopoly Regulation”\, Economic Theory Seminar\, Toulouse: TSE\, Se
 ptember 10\, 2024\, 11:00–12:30\, room Auditorium 6.\n\nIt can be difficul
 t to predict market conditions\, like consumer demand and production costs
 . Are there regulations\, for monopolistic markets\, that remain effective
  even when market conditions are unpredictable? Drawing from the literatur
 e on online optimization\, I address this question using a new framework -
 - doubly robust mechanism design -- that relaxes prior knowledge for both 
 the regulator and the firm. I find regulations that obtain meaningful and 
 optimal welfare guarantees\; they incentivize the firm to care about consu
 mer surplus in addition to profits\, but otherwise leave it with a free ha
 nd.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20240910T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20240910T133000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, September 10\, 2024\, 11:00–12:30\, room Auditoriu
 m 6
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2024-doubly-robust-monopoly-reg
 ulation
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