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DTSTART:20241027T030000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:calendar.134287.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260510T030607Z
CREATED:20240325T121001Z
DESCRIPTION:Daniele Condorelli (Unversity of Warwick)\, “Buyer-Optimal Plat
 form Design”\, Economics of Platforms Seminar\, June 4\, 2024\, 14:00–15:0
 0\, Zoom Meeting.\n\nA platform matches a unit-mass of sellers\, each owni
 ng a single product of heterogeneous\nquality\, to a unit-mass of buyers w
 ith differing valuations for unit-quality. After matching\, sellers make t
 ake-it-or-leave-it price-offers to buyers. Initially\, valuations of buyer
 s are\nonly known to them and the platform\, but sellers make inferences f
 rom the matching algorithm. The efficient matching is positive-assortative
 \, but buyer-optimal matchings are\, often\,\nstochastically negative-asso
 rtative (i.e.\, compared to lower-quality sellers\, high-quality ones\nare
  matched to buyers with lower expected valuation). Albeit everyone trades\
 , generating\nrents for the side lacking bargaining power results in ineff
 icient matching.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20240604T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20240604T160000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:June 4\, 2024\, 14:00–15:00\, Zoom Meeting
SUMMARY:Economics of Platforms Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2024-buyer-optimal-platform-des
 ign
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