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DTSTART:20231029T030000
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UID:calendar.132525.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260512T024323Z
CREATED:20230907T121001Z
DESCRIPTION:Kevin R. Williams (Yale University)\, “Dynamic Price Competitio
 n: Theory and Evidence from Airline Markets”\, Industrial Organization sem
 inar\, TSE\, September 18\, 2023\, 14:15–15:30\, room Auditorium 4.\n\nWe 
 introduce a model of dynamic pricing in perishable goods markets with comp
 etition and provide conditions for equilibrium uniqueness. Pricing dynamic
 s are rich because both own and competitor scarcity affect future profits.
  We identify new competitive forces that can lead to misallocation due to 
 selling units too quickly: the Bertrand scarcity trap. We empirically esti
 mate our model using daily prices and bookings for competing U.S. airlines
 . We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes to those where firms use pri
 cing heuristics based on observed internal pricing rules at a large airlin
 e. We find that pricing heuristics increase revenues (4-5%) and consumer s
 urplus (3%).
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20230918T151500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20230918T163000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:TSE\, September 18\, 2023\, 14:15–15:30\, room Auditorium 4
SUMMARY:Industrial Organization seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2023-dynamic-price-competition-
 theory-and-evidence-airline-markets
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