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DTSTART:20211031T030000
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RDATE:20221030T030000
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UID:calendar.127796.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260609T081703Z
CREATED:20220214T131001Z
DESCRIPTION:Jason D. Hartline (Northwestern University)\, “Robust Analysis 
 of Auction Equilibria”\, Economic Theory Seminar\, Toulouse: TSE\, May 24\
 , 2022\, 11:00–12:30\, room Auditorium 4.\n\nEquilibria in auctions can be
  very difficult to analyze beyond the symmetric environments where revenue
  equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robu
 st approach to evaluating the equilibria of auctions. Rather than identify
  the equilibria of an auction under specific environments\, it considers m
 in-max analysis where an auction is evaluated according to the worst envir
 onment and worst equilibrium in that environment. It identifies a non-equi
 librium property of auctions that governs whether or not their worst-case 
 equilibria are good for welfare and revenue. This property is easy to anal
 yze\, can be refined from data\, and composes across markets where multipl
 e auctions are run simultaneously.\n\nJoint work with Darrell Hoy and Sam 
 Taggart.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20220524T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20220524T133000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, May 24\, 2022\, 11:00–12:30\, room Auditorium 4
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2022-robust-analysis-auction-eq
 uilibria
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