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UID:calendar.120549.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260308T102606Z
CREATED:20200416T141001Z
DESCRIPTION:Ozlem Bedre Defolie (ESMT-Berlin)\, “Platform Competition for E
 xclusivity with a Marquee Seller”\, Economics of Platforms Seminar\, June 
 2\, 2020\, 14:00–15:00\, room Zoom meeting.\n\nWe analyse the implications
  of allowing exclusive dealing between a marquee product seller and two co
 mpeting platforms that are asymmetric in their locked-in consumer base and
  compete for ‘single-homing’ new consumers. On the seller side\, the platf
 orms choose the number of fringe products\, which generate uncertain value
 \, and compete for the marquee product\, which is better than an average f
 ringe product\, by offering a menu of exclusive dealing and non-exclusive 
 dealing contracts. We show that an exclusive dealing (ED) equilibrium wher
 e the big platform has the marquee always exists. ED equilibrium is unique
  if the marquee gives competitive advantage to the big platform\, that is\
 , when new consumer market is covered and the small platform’s quality wou
 ld be lower without the marquee. Otherwise\, there exists also a nonexclus
 ive equilibrium where both platforms have the marquee. ED harms welfare by
  lowering variety and the expected quality on the small platform. If the p
 latforms are allowed to price discriminate between their loyal and new con
 sumers\, in the ED equilibrium the big platform offers more fringe product
 s and the small platform offers fewer fringe products. Price discriminatio
 n lowers fees for new consumers and increases fees for locked-in consumers
 .
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20200602T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20200602T160000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:June 2\, 2020\, 14:00–15:00\, room Zoom meeting
SUMMARY:Economics of Platforms Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2020-platform-competition-exclu
 sivity-marquee-seller
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