#### Cutting the Queue to the Dentist: Waiting Times, Public-Private Interaction and Consumer Surplus

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Having both public and private production is common in health care

- The UK, Australia, Austria, US veterans, Nordics
- Public production
  - Ensures access to basic necessities for all
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- The UK, Australia, Austria, US veterans, Nordics
- Public production
  - Ensures access to basic necessities for all
  - Limits market power
- The length of the wait is a key issue!
  - Equity concerns, disciplining market power, deadweight loss



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How is the distribution of consumer surplus affected?

#### This paper

- The Finnish dental care industry provides an excellent setting
  - Affordable (€117), but congested (32 days) public production and expensive (€178) private production
  - Practically no insurance and high-quality public production
- I build and estimate a model of the industry
  - ► Eq. objects: consumers' choices, private prices, and public waiting times
- Quantify the equilibrium effects of public production capacity increase

#### My main contribution

• How do markets with public and private production work?

Dinerstein and Smith (2021); Jimenez-Hernandez and Seira (2022); Saltzman (2023); Atal et al. (2024)

I study markets where public production is congested

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    - ★ but the increase is less for the lowest income decile
  - > Total welfare might improve if public production is not costlier than private production

# Data, market definition, and product definition

• Consumer level panel of all Finnish residents, visiting a dentist or not 2014-2017

Visit level information contains date, procedures performed, prices, and waiting times

Consumer characteristics, and consumers' and practices' locations

• I focus on non-emergency patients

#### Market and product

• Market is a municipality-year combination

> Drop the ten most populous municipalities and their neighboring municipalities

• A product is a dental care treatment episode

## All income groups in the sample use public dental care, but private dental care is common for high earners

Figure 1: Sample's Consumers' Choices by Net Income



### Model and estimation

#### Consumers' choice of dental practice is a random utility model



Public practices' waiting times are determined in the equilibrium

- Public practices waiting times
  - $\blacktriangleright \ s_{jt}I_t = q_{jt}$

- Equilibrium condition
  - Number of dentists  $d_{jt}$   $\uparrow$ 
    - ightarrow Waiting times  $b_{jt}\downarrow$
    - ightarrow Demand  $s_{jt}$   $\uparrow$
    - ightarrow Waiting times  $b_{jt}$   $\uparrow$
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$$\underbrace{b_{jt}}_{\text{waiting time (days)}} = \underbrace{\psi_1}_{\text{service time}} \times \underbrace{\frac{s_{jt}I_t}{d_{jt}}}_{\text{demand per dentists}} + \underbrace{\omega_{jt}}_{\text{error term dentists}}$$
$$s_{jt} = \frac{1}{I_t} \sum_{i \in I_t} \frac{\exp(\delta_{jt}(b_{jt}(s_{jt})) + \mu_{ijt})}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_{kt} + \mu_{ikt})}, \ j \in J_t^{pub}$$

Private practices set prices to maximize profits

Differentiated Nash-Bertrand

$$p_{jt} = mc_{jt} + \underbrace{q_{jt}(p_t, b_t) \left[ - rac{\partial q_{jt}(p_t, b_t)}{\partial p_{jt}} 
ight]^{-1}}_{ ext{inverse of the price semi-elasticity}}$$

- Demand depends on waiting times!
  - Congestion externality arises

## Elasticities and markups

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Figure 2: Own-elasticities by Net Income





## Counterfactual

#### Counterfactual

 $\bullet$  Increase the number of dentists at the public practices by 20%  $\approx$  250 FTE dentists

Increase evening/weekend work, reform dental school, or recruit retired dentists

• Using data for 2015

#### Equilibrium prices, waiting times and market shares

(a) % Change in Waiting Times and Prices



(b) P.P. Change in Average Market Shares

#### Which income decile benefits the most?



#### Figure 4: Change in CS by Net Income





Does increasing the capacity improve welfare?

• The change in total welfare is



• Use the equation to get an upper bound for public practices' marginal costs!

If  $mc^{pub} < \mathbf{\in} 197$ , then the policy is welfare improving

- Private practices' marginal costs are a natural benchmark
  - ▶ €197 is the 43th percentile

#### Conclusions

- Public practice waiting times decrease slightly
  - Difficult to reduce waiting times by just increasing supply!
- Public production's ability to encourage private competition is limited
  - Public and private practices cater to different consumers!
- Consumers who dislike waiting but still visit a public practice benefit the most

#### Appendix 1

Variable	Estimate	Standard Errors
Price $\times$ Income (Thousands)	1.009e-04	6.190e-06
$Price \times Income^2$	-2.960e-07	5.430e-08
Price  imes Woman	1.098e-03	7.900e-05
Price  imes College	1.851e-03	8.760e-05
Waiting Time $ imes$ Income	-1.672e-04	1.530e-05
Waiting Time $ imes$ Income <sup>2</sup>	-1.190e-06	1.590e-07
Waiting Time $ imes$ Woman	1.351e-03	1.766e-04
Waiting Time $ imes$ College	4.326e-04	1.985e-04
Income	9.958e-03	1.151e-03
Income <sup>2</sup>	-9.750e-05	1.050e-05
Age	8.081e-02	8.441e-04
Age <sup>2</sup>	-6.803e-04	8.790e-06
Woman	1.677e-01	1.439e-02
College	-1.830e-01	1.621e-02
Old Age Pension	1.447e-02	6.648e-03
Distance	-9.576e-02	3.438e-04
Distance <sup>2</sup>	3.652e-04	7.830e-06

#### Table 1: Results: Preference Heterogeneity

Note: 2.3 million consumer-year observations and 18,4 million consumer-yearalternative observations. The estimates are from a conditional logit model with 1,484 alternative specific constants or  $\delta_{it}$ s. ► Back

#### Demand model: Mean utility

Table 2: Mean Utility Parameter Estimates

Dependent Variable:	$\widehat{\delta}_{jt}$					
Sample:	Private Practices			Public Practices		
Estimator:	OLS	OLS	IV	OLS	OLS	IV
Constant	-4.568***			-3.639***		
	(0.1390)			(0.0738)		
Price	-0.0055***	-0.0062***	-0.0464***			
	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)			
Waiting Time (days)				-0.0150***	-0.0155**	-0.0895***
				(0.0021)	(0.0038)	(0.0066)
Ν	771	771	771	713	713	713
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
F-test (1st stage)			80.973			124.39

Notes: With year FEs the SEs are clustered at the yearly level. Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1.

#### Queuing model

#### Table 3: Queuing Model Parameter Estimates

Dependent Variables:	Yearly Average Waiting Time			
Estimator:	OLS	IV	IV	IV
Constant	33.63***	-132.1		
	(0.9252)	(214.1)		
Demand Per Dentists	-0.0043***	0.3697	0.0660	0.0659**
	(0.0016)	(0.4830)	(0.0608)	(0.0202)
N	713	713	713	713
Year FE	No	No	No	Yes
Municipality Type FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
IV: Distance to the Nearest Competitor				
F-test (1st stage)		0.60804	4.2913	4.2913

Notes: With FEs the SEs are clustered at the level of FEs. Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1.

#### Consumer surplus and private practices' profits



Figure 7: Absolute Change in CS and Profits

Figure 6: Percentage Change in CS and Profits

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