

## Maïva Ropaul

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### Professional experience

- Sept. 2014-... **Lecturer in Economics and Management**, Département Économie et Gestion, École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay (formerly known as "École Normale Supérieure de Cachan"). The formal designation of this position is "agrégé préparateur". French Écoles Normales Supérieures allocate this selective short-term assignment to young scholars to pursue post-doctoral research (CES Cachan, now merged with CREST) and perform teaching activities (192h per year).
- 2011-2014 **Doctoral fellowship, French Ministry for Higher Education and Research Grant**, CRED, Université Panthéon-Assas. **Teaching assistant**, Département Économie et Gestion, École Normale Supérieure de Cachan (64h per year).

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### Education

- Déc. 2015 **PhD in Economics with highest honors**, Université Panthéon-Assas, "*Essays on the Economic Analysis of Corporate Civil Liability*". PhD advisor : Pr. Bruno Deffains. Thesis committee : Pr. B. Crettez (President) ; Pr. S. Spaeter (Rapporteur), Pr. S. Rouillon (Rapporteur), Pr. L. Franzoni. Registration on 18/07/2011 and PhD defense on 08/12/2015. This thesis studies the effects of liability rules on firms' accident risk prevention. I rely on modeling, lab experiments and empirical analysis to show how those legal norms - combined or not with social norms - can induce a socially beneficial corporate behavior.
- 2010-2011 **Master 2 Economics and Public Policy**, École Polytechnique, Institut des Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po Paris) and ENSAE.
- 2007-2011 **Graduate of the École Normale Supérieure de Cachan with a French Ministry for Higher Education and Research scholarship** (élève-normalienne), Département Économie et Gestion. The scholarship is granted on the basis of merit criteria after a highly selective examination.
- 2010 **Economics and Management teaching degree** with a specialization in accounting and finance ("Agrégation d'Économie et Gestion"). The "agrégation" is a highly selective civil service competitive examination for the public education system (at the country level, about 20 positions per year are opened for the accounting and finance specialization). It allows the "agrégé" to teach at high school level but also at university.
- 2008-2009 **Master 1 Management et Initiation à la Recherche**, jointly accredited by Université Paris Dauphine.  
**Master 1 Économie Théorique et Empirique**, jointly accredited by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne.

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- M. Ropaul, Consumer Boycotts : Does Trust in Law-Making and Law-Enforcing Institutions Matter ?, **Forthcoming** in *Journal of Economic Issues* (**rang B HCERES, rang 3 CNRS (Gen.)**) .

This paper estimates the effects of trust in political and judicial institutions on individuals' propensity to take part in consumer boycotts. In particular, this study disentangles the effects of institutional trust and quality. The analysis relies on data from the 2010 European Social Survey, which is a path breaking comparative study of how justice is perceived and allows a valid measure of judicial and political trust to be constructed. A two-step instrumental variable method was used to measure the effects of institutional trust, controlling for micro- and macro-level factors. The results indicate that trust in law-making institutions is negatively associated with boycott participation, whereas the relationship between judicial trust in institutions and an individual's likelihood to boycott is U-shaped. The findings are robust to the introduction of social capital and sociodemographic variables.

- B. Deffains (CRED, U. Panthéon-Assas), C. Fluet (U. Laval) & M. Ropaul, Causation and Standard of Proof from an Economic Perspective, *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2016.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the extent to which the causation requirement is consistent with the provision of efficient incentives to potential tortfeasors. Specifically, we focus on the role of the well-known "but for" or "sine qua non" test. We focus on situations where the tort system may provide sub-optimal incentives because of : (1) Limited liability problems, or ; (2) other sources of uncertainty, in particular the uncertainty about the injurer's actual level of care.

- B. Deffains (CRED, U. Panthéon-Assas) & M. Ropaul (forthcoming), Sanction as a Tool to Control Corporate Behavior, in "*Company Law and CSR. New Legal and Economic Challenges*", Ivan Tchotourian, ed. Emile Bruylant.

This book chapter provides a brief survey of the literature on social control of corporate behavior. In the Law and Economics literature, legal sanctions have been thought of as a key factor in the control of firm's behaviours. The central question that occupies the authors is the structure of the legal liability that minimizes the harm committed by companies and their social costs. However, recent work in behavioral and experimental economics suggests that economic agents are strongly influenced by social and moral norms. This theoretical and empirical assessment suggests that the definition of the corporate obligations is made by legal instruments, but also by social norms. In particular, the influence of social norms is embodied in the concept of CSR. Furthermore, we show that the State is to some extent able to manage the formation of these social norms, to model all the forces that shape corporate behavior.

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- F. Pannequin (CREST, ENS Paris Saclay) & M. Ropaul, Self-Insurance and Liability Insurance under One-Sided Ambiguity. "**Job Market paper**". Submitted.

This paper provides an experimental test of the effects of tort rules on the demand for both insurance and self-insurance. We consider two standard tort rules, namely strict liability and negligence rule, both in risk and one-sided ambiguity contexts. The experiment relies on a magnitude model for a unilateral accident with civil liability. To differentiate between risk and ambiguity, we successively assume that the potential injurer has a perfect or an imprecise knowledge of the probability of accident ; in the latter case, we have recourse to the KMM approach (Klibanoff et al. (2005)). Our experimental results indicate that the substitutability property between insurance and self-insurance holds both under risk and ambiguity. Moreover, the data show that under risk with availability of insurance, strict liability and negligence rule are not equivalent in their deterrence effect, contrary to the predictions of the standard model. Finally, ambiguity does not modify the incentives provided by the negligence rule, other things being equal, while we observe an increase in the demand for self-insurance under strict liability.

- S. Bienenstock (CRED, U. Panthéon-Assas) & M. Ropaul, The Price of Freedom : Choosing Between Long- and Short-term Contracts in the Presence of Projection Bias. **Revise and Resubmit** in *European Journal of Law and Economics* (**rang A HCERES, rang 2 CNRS (EcoDroit)**)

Empirical evidence shows that consumers are often subject to a projection bias, such as they exaggerate the degree to which their future tastes will resemble their current ones. Such biases are particularly acute when consumers commit to a long-term contract. This paper aims at assessing the consequences of projection bias and at defining when a legal intervention is relevant. In this perspective, we compare the situation of naive and sophisticated agents, both with and without regulation regarding contract duration and early termination fees. The demand side of the market consists either of sophisticated agents, who perfectly anticipate their future willingness to pay (WTP) ; or of naive consumers, who exhibit a projection bias. The supply side is a monopoly offering long- and short-term contracts. Our main contribution consists in showing that naive consumers are not always worse off than sophisticated agents. If consumers have an increasing WTP for a given service or product, naive agents can actually be better off than sophisticated ones. We argue that naivete protects consumers against a price increase. However, naivete also leads to less exchanges on the market, thus generating a deadweight loss. Hence, the overall effect of naivete on social welfare is ambiguous. As far as public policy is concerned, we conclude that regulating contract duration is only relevant in some circumstances, depending on the market characteristics and on the bias.

- I. Matera (LIRAES, U. Paris Descartes), M. Ropaul & L. Roussey (LIRAES, U. Paris Descartes) , Putting Your Life on Hold for Your Parents : An Economic Analysis of Long-Term Care.

This theoretical paper studies informal care provided by children to their dependent parents. The originality of this paper is twofold : 1) We consider the possibility of intrafamilial transfers as well as the decision of saving of the dependent person ; 2) This theoretical model allows to deal with an important empirical problem, which is the endogeneity of child's health and informal care provision (Doe et al., 2015, Coe and Van Houtven, 2009). We want to evaluate the effects of long-term care public policies on the basis of this model.

- C. Le Clainche (LEM, U. Lille 2), M. Ropaul & J. Wittwer (U. Bordeaux), Preferences for Redistribution : Normative Rationality, Self-Interest and Social Identification.

I joined this project already started by my two co-authors. My role is to update the literature review and to carry out the econometric analysis on a new data base. This paper aims to evaluate the determinants of individual preference for redistribution. The proposition that we test is that the norms displayed by individuals to justify their preferences for redistribution (eg norms of equality or meritocratic) are only a screen of their personal interest.

-C. Deffin (ENS Paris-Saclay) & M. Ropaul, Subjective probabilities of sanction, norms, legitimacy and everyday life crimes in Europe.

Crimes of everyday life are usually defined as unfair and unethical practices committed in the marketplace by people who see themselves and who are seen by others as respectable citizens. This paper performs a cross-country econometric analysis with data from the 2010 European Social Survey to test the main drivers of this specific criminal behavior. Particularly, we evaluate the significance of 1) subjective probabilities of sanction; 2) norms internalization and 3) the perceived legitimacy of the judicial system. We focus on three everyday life crimes : false insurance claims, buying something that might have been stolen and traffic offenses. Controlling for sociodemographic variables, social capital and country fixed-effects, we find that the norm internalization explanation has a significant and negative effect on the propensity to commit an everyday life crime for our three variables of interest. The judicial system legitimacy leads to ambiguous results. Our results also show that the Beckerian approach centered on the subjective probability of sanction fails to predict the individual choice to commit an offense for our three dependent variables. This latter result sheds light on the need to reconfigure the public enforcement policy.

#### Conferences and seminars

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ADRES : Feb. 2017 (Toulouse). French Economic Association - *Association Française de Science Economique* (AFSE) : June 2016 (Nancy). French Speaking IOEA days (*Institutional and Organizational Economics Academy*, formerly known as ESNIE), Feb. 2016 (Paris). Séminaire LIEN (*Law, Institutions and Economics in Nanterre*), Dec. 2015. *European Association of Law and Economics* (EALE) : Sept. 2014 (Aix-Marseille), Sept. 2015 (Vienne). *International Society for New Institutional Economics* (ISNIE) : June 2014 (Duke University). French Experimental Economics Association - *Association Française d'Economie Expérimentale* (ASFEE) : June 2015 (Paris). *German Law and Economics Association* (GLEA) : July 2015 (Düsseldorf). The Future of Law and Economics, doctoral conference jointly organized by Maastricht University, Université Panthéon-Assas and Université Paris-Ouest Nanterre : March 2012 (Paris), March 2013 (Rotterdam), March 2014 (Maastricht). French Speaking ESNIE Days : Dec. 2014. Augustin Cournot Doctoral Days : May 2012 (Strasbourg). ESNIE : May 2012 (Cargèse).

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2011-... **Département Économie et Gestion, ENS de Cachan.**

**Undergraduate level (L3)**

- Introduction to accounting (12h), accounting (30h), corporate finance (30h).
- Econometrics and introduction to Stata (18h\*2, tutorial).
- International economics (12h\*2, tutorial).
- Introduction to management and strategy (2014-2015, 6h, lecture for students from engineering and natural sciences departments).
- Internship tutor : Sarah Gharbi (Summer 2016).

**Graduate level (M1)**

- Advanced econometrics (2011-2013, 18h\*2, tutorial).
- Supervision of Master theses (Master 1) : Astrid de Masfrand (2014-2015), "Economic Analysis of Electoral Fraud"; Léo Guilhem (2015-2016), "Property Crimes, Violent Crimes and Economic Hardship"; Cyndie Deffin (2015-2016), "Everyday's Life Crime and Perceptions of the Justice System in Europe". Sarah Gharbi (2016-2017), "Ambiguity and Tax Evasion : a Theoretical Analysis"; Alexandre Bidel (2016-2017), "Vote and Boycott : Complementary or Alternative Forms of Political Participation?".

**Training for the "Agrégation d'Économie et de Gestion" (M2)**

- Introduction to Environmental Economics (3h).
- Oral examinations in Economics.

**Administrative activities**

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**Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne - Antenne de Cachan** : co-organizer of the lunch seminar (since sept. 2016).

**École Normale Supérieure de Cachan** : examiner of the entrance exam (2016) : Accounting and Finance (admission to the undergraduate program of the ENS Cachan); Economics (admission to the graduate program).

**Université Panthéon-Assas** : elected member of the Economics Faculty Council ("Conseil de l'U.F.R. de Sciences économiques"), 2013-2015. Elected member of the Economics Doctoral School board (Conseil de l'École Doctorale d'économie, gestion, informatique et communication), 2013-2015.

**Association des Doctorants et des Docteurs d'Assas (ADDA)** : co-founder. Vice-president (2012-2014), treasurer (2012-2014, 2017-2018). The aim of this association is to promote Université Panthéon-Assas doctoral program and to create a professional network for the young scholars from this university.