Working paper

Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous

Philippe De Donder, and John E. Roemer

JEL codes

  • D21: Firm Behavior: Theory
  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D62: Externalities
  • H82: Governmental Property

Replaced by

Philippe De Donder, and John E. Roemer, Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firm's Objectives are Endogenous, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n. 3, May 2009, pp. 414–423.

Reference

Philippe De Donder, and John E. Roemer, Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous, IDEI Working Paper, n. 414, September 2006.

See also

Published in

IDEI Working Paper, n. 414, September 2006