Working paper

Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle Versus Stackelberg

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, and Eugenio Peluso

JEL codes

  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • H41: Public Goods

Replaced by

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, and Eugenio Peluso, Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 14, n. 6, December 2012, pp. 879–909.

Reference

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, and Eugenio Peluso, Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle Versus Stackelberg, CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 7646, January 2010.

See also

Published in

CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 7646, January 2010