Working paper

Does Propitious Selection Explain why Riskier People buy less Insurance?

Philippe De Donder, and Jean Hindriks

JEL codes

  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • G22: Insurance • Insurance Companies • Actuarial Studies

Replaced by

Philippe De Donder, and Jean Hindriks, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Propitious Selection, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 38, n. 1, February 2009, pp. 73–86.

Reference

Philippe De Donder, and Jean Hindriks, Does Propitious Selection Explain why Riskier People buy less Insurance?, IDEI Working Paper, n. 399, March 2006.

See also

Published in

IDEI Working Paper, n. 399, March 2006