Document de travail

Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation

Takuro Yamashita

Résumé

This paper discusses some connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of agents' behaviors. Specifically, under certain conditions such as private values and ``rich'' interdependent values, we show that implementation in (one-round or iterative) undominated strategies, a solution concept robust to strategic uncertainty, is equivalent to Bayesian implementation with arbitrary type spaces, a solution concept robust to structural uncertainty.

Mots-clés

Robust implementation; Strategic and structural uncertainty;

Codes JEL

  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • D86: Economics of Contract: Theory

Remplacé par

Takuro Yamashita, « Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation », Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, 2015, p. 267–279.

Référence

Takuro Yamashita, « Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation », TSE Working Paper, n° 14-514, avril 2014.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 14-514, avril 2014