Document de travail

Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition

Patrick Rey et Jean Tirole

Résumé

The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect) substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for the full range between perfect substitutes and perfect complements. Second, it studies the desirability of joint marketing alliances, an alternative to mergers. It shows that a combination of two informationfree regulatory requirements, mandated unbundling by the joint marketing entity and unfettered independent marketing by the firms, makes joint-marketing alliances always socially desirable, whether tacit coordination is feasible or not.

Mots-clés

tacit collusion; cooperation; substitutes and complements; essentiality; joint marketing agreements; patent pools; independent licensing; unbundling; co-opetition;

Codes JEL

  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • L24: Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
  • L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
  • O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

Remplacé par

Patrick Rey et Jean Tirole, « Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition », Journal of Political Economy, vol. 127, n° 6, décembre 2019, p. 3018–3069.

Référence

Patrick Rey et Jean Tirole, « Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition », TSE Working Paper, n° 13-439, 23 octobre 2013, révision janvier 2018.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 13-439, 23 octobre 2013, révision janvier 2018