Article

Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination

Angel Lopez et Patrick Rey

Résumé

This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tarifs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way if switching costs are sufficiently large. In the absence of termination-based price discrimination, however, such foreclosure strategies are not profitable.

Remplace

Angel Lopez et Patrick Rey, « Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination », TSE Working Paper, n° 09-056, juin 2009, révision 2 avril 2015.

Référence

Angel Lopez et Patrick Rey, « Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination », The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 64, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 436–465.

Publié dans

The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 64, n° 3, septembre 2016, p. 436–465