Article

Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation

Luis Cabral et David Salant

Résumé

The EU mandated a single standard for second generation wireless telecommunications, whereas the US allowed several incompatible standards to battle for market share. Motivated by this example, we argue that a single standard leads to a free riding problem, and thus to a significant decrease in marginal incentives for R&D investment. In this context, keeping two separate standards may be a necessary evil to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. We also provide conditions such that a non-standardization equilibrium is better for consumers and for society as a whole.

Mots-clés

Standardization; Innovation; Free-riding; Spectrum regulation;

Codes JEL

  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L51: Economics of Regulation
  • L52: Industrial Policy • Sectoral Planning Methods
  • L96: Telecommunications

Référence

Luis Cabral et David Salant, « Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation », International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 36, septembre 2014, p. 48–56.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 36, septembre 2014, p. 48–56